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THE INEVITABLE BACKLASH TO 
GLOBALIZATION: WHY FREE TRADE HAS TO 
WORK FOR EVERYONE  
Stephen Morrison1 
For decades, economists have praised the benefits of liberalized trade: 
increased economic growth; increased efficiency and innovation; access 
to higher quality, lower-priced goods, and services; and greater global 
equality. While reductions in tariffs and other trade barriers have spurred 
economic growth worldwide, the resulting economic redistribution 
threatens to undo the system of liberalized trade envisioned by the World 
Trade Organization (“WTO”) and the Bretton Woods institutions. This 
Article discusses the history and foundation of the WTO and how the 
political consensus on liberalized trade led to an overestimation of its 
benefits. This Article addresses the inequitable distribution of the wealth 
created by free trade and the implications of ignoring such wealth 
discrepancies on the future of the WTO and international trade. Finally, 
this Article argues that States must address wealth distribution problems 
and that the WTO and its Member States must adopt a more permissive 
stance in allowing Member States to enact policies to protect those 
citizens left behind by free trade. 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE DEATH OF FREE TRADE? 
The impact of free trade on domestic economies has been one of the 
defining global themes of the past few years. In the United States, 
Democrats2 and Republicans3 alike disparage free trade agreements. 
Voters in the United Kingdom, weary of the perceived effects of 
globalization on the country, elected to leave the European Union, a 
move that will likely make a substantial impact on world trade.4 In 
Europe, tens of thousands took to the streets to protest the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement.5 The year 2016 ended with a fatal blow 
for free trade agreements, as the election of Donald Trump signaled an 
end to the TTIP negotiations6 and the withdrawal of the United States 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership.7 Fears that the World Trade 
Organization’s (“WTO”) system of free trade could be undermined by 
increased unilateral action have only intensified as the United States and 
  
 2. Nicole Gaudiano, Bernie Sanders Pledges to Rewrite ‘Disastrous’ Trade 
Deals, USA TODAY (Mar. 31, 2016, 2:24 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/onpolitics/2016/03/31/bernie-sanders-
pledges-rewrite-disastrous-trade-deals/82473012/;Michael A. Memoli, Hillary Clinton 
Once Called TPP the ‘Gold Standard.’ Here’s Why, and What She Says About the Trade 
Deal Now, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2016, 7 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-
trade-tpp-20160926-snap-story.html. 
 3. S.A. Miller, Trump Vows to Cancel Asia Trade Deal as President—and Puts 
NAFTA on Notice, WASH. TIMES (June 28, 2016), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/jun/28/donald-trump-vows-to-cancel-trans-
pacific-partners/. 
 4. Shawn Tully, Here’s What Brexit Voters Should Know About Free Trade, 
FORTUNE (June 23, 2016, 12:45 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/06/23/brexit-free-trade/. 
 5. Michael Nienaber, Tens of Thousands Protest in Europe Against Atlantic 
Free Trade Deals, REUTERS (Sept. 17, 2016, 10:42 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-usa-ttip/tens-of-thousands-protest-in-europe-
against-atlantic-free-trade-deals-idUSKCN11N0H6. 
 6. Samuel Osborne, Angela Merkel Suggests TTIP Trade Deal Won’t be 
Concluded Under Barack Obama’s Presidency, INDEPENDENT (Nov. 17, 2016, 5:49 PM), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/ttip-on-hold-angela-merkel-barack-
obama-trade-deal-latest-a7423446.html.  
 7. Ylan Q. Mui, President Trump Signs Order to Withdraw from Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2017, 2:10 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/01/23/president-trump-signs-
order-to-withdraw-from-transpacific-partnership/.  
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China engage in a potentially destabilizing trade war,8 and the United 
States continues to block new judges from being appointed to the WTO 
Appellate Body (“AB”).9 
The liberalization of trade has gone relatively unchallenged since the 
end of World War II. Economists were, and still are, largely in 
agreement that reducing tariffs and ending protectionist policies leads to 
an expansion of markets, ultimately creating net benefits for all countries 
and, in turn, their citizens.10 However, a growing body of scholarship 
suggests that, particularly since the late 1980s, trade liberalization, while 
increasing overall gains, has benefitted certain groups to the detriment of 
others.11 
This Article examines the reasons that trade liberalization has come 
under closer scrutiny in recent years. Part II explores the background and 
workings of the WTO. It discusses how changing demographics within 
the WTO and the ascension of developing countries like China, India, 
and Brazil have shifted the balance of power in world trade. Part III 
examines the “winners” and “losers” of trade liberalization and how 
growing disparities between these groups has led to a distrust of free 
trade and international organizations such as the WTO. The Article 
argues that if policymakers refuse to address the fundamental 
distributional problems that accompany free trade, the WTO and 
underlying principles of trade liberalization will come under further 
  
 8. John Cassidy, Trump’s Trade War Could Make the Trump Recession a 
Reality, NEW YORKER (Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-
columnists/trumps-trade-war-could-make-the-trump-recession-a-reality. 
 9. John Brinkley, Trump Is Close to Shutting Down the WTO’s Appeals Court, 
FORBES (Sept. 27, 2018, 2:42 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnbrinkley/2018/09/27/trump-is-close-to-shutting-down-
the-wtos-appeals-court/#556d3cf77ab6. 
 10. See Dennis Froning, The Benefits of Free Trade: A Guide for Policymakers, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 25, 2000), https://www.heritage.org/trade/report/the-benefits-
free-trade-guide-policymakers (“[T]he benefits of free trade extend well beyond 
American households. Free trade helps to spread the value of freedom, reinforce the rule 
of law, and foster economic development in poor countries.”); James McBride & 
Mohammed Aly Sergie, NAFTA’s Economic Impact, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (OCT. 1, 
2018), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/naftas-economic-impact. 
 11. See, e.g., DANI RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX (2011); DANI RODRIK, 
HAS GLOBALIZATION GONE TOO FAR (1997); IAN FLETCHER, FREE TRADE DOESN’T WORK 
(2009); Branko Milanovic, Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: in History and 
Now (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 6259, 2012). 
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attack from protectionist ideologues. Part IV offers solutions to minimize 
the disparity between the “winners” and “losers” of free trade. It analyzes 
the likely interaction between each solution and WTO rules and predicts 
the likelihood of the solutions withstanding the purview of the AB.  
II. BACKGROUND 
The WTO and other free trade agreements (“FTAs”) are founded on 
the principle that “liberal trade policies—policies that allow the 
unrestricted flow of goods and services—sharpen competition, motivate 
innovation and breed success.”12 The theory that free trade is 
advantageous to society dates back to the classical economist David 
Ricardo, who posited that free trade would lead countries to produce 
goods and services that they could manufacture at a comparative 
advantage or a lower opportunity cost than other economic actors.13 
The following scenario illustrates how comparative advantage works. 
As shown in Figure 1, if each country produces only one good, Country 
A can produce thirty million automobiles or twenty million televisions, 
and Country B can produce thirty-five million automobiles or sixty 
million televisions. Thus, Country B has an absolute advantage in 
producing both automobiles and televisions—that is, Country B is 
superior at producing both automobiles and televisions. Country B also 
has a comparative advantage in producing televisions, because it is 
relatively better at producing televisions than automobiles. Country B is 
three times better at producing televisions, but only 1.17 times better at 
producing automobiles than Country A. While Country B still has an 
absolute advantage in producing automobiles, Country B does not have a 
comparative advantage in producing automobiles because the 
opportunity cost14 of producing one car would be two televisions, while 
  
 12. The Case for Open Trade, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 
2020). 
 13. Free Trade in Economic Theories, EXPLORING ECON. (2016), 
https://www.exploring-economics.org/en/discover/free-trade-economic-theories/.  
 14. Opportunity costs represent the benefits an individual, investor, or business 
misses out on when choosing one alternative over another. 
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Country A would only bear an opportunity cost of 0.67 televisions for 
every automobile it produces.15  
 
Figure 1. Production Capabilities of Country A and Country B 
 Country A Country B 
Automobiles 30 million 35 million 
Televisions 20 million 60 million 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparative Advantage in Country A and Country B 
 
 
 
 
The greatest advantage, reflected in Figure 2 as the widest gap, lies 
with Country B’s television production. If countries A and B allocate 
resources evenly to both goods, the combined output is: Automobiles = 
15 + 17.5 = 32.5; Televisions = 10 + 30 = 40. Therefore, the total 
combined output for both countries would be 72.5 million automobiles 
and televisions. However, if both countries specialize based on their 
comparative advantage, Country B would manufacture only televisions, 
while Country A would manufacture only automobiles. The total output 
in this scenario would be ninety million automobiles and televisions, 
  
 15. This relies on the assumption that the production of one automobile and one 
television is of equal social and economic value to a country. 
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where Country A produces thirty million automobiles and Country B 
produces sixty million televisions.16  
From the viewpoint of the WTO and many economists, comparative 
advantage proves that both countries can benefit from trade even if one is 
better at producing any and all goods and services than the other 
country.17 By specializing, countries maximize their production 
capabilities, leading to cheaper prices in goods and benefitting society.18 
What these economists have ignored, however, is that while liberalized 
trade has led to increased production and overall wealth,19 the 
distributional gains of this wealth have largely benefitted the world’s 
wealthiest citizens.20 Further, as economist Richard Baldwin has shown, 
the gains from globalization have been concentrated in just six 
countries.21 
A. From the GATT to the WTO 
The greatest driving force of liberalized trade has been the WTO and 
its precursor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”).22 
Following World War II, both the United States and European countries 
  
 16. See Comparative Advantage, ECON. ONLINE, 
http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Global_economics/Comparative_advantage.html (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2020). 
 17. Morgan Rose, A Brief History of the Concept of Comparative Advantage, 
LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (Aug. 6, 2001), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Columns/Teachers/comparative.html.  
 18. See Donald J. Boudreaux & Nita Ghei, The Benefits of Free Trade: 
Addressing Key Myths, MERCATUS CTR. (May 23, 2018), 
https://www.mercatus.org/publication/benefits-free-trade-addressing-key-myths. 
 19. See IMF Staff, Global Trade Liberalization and the Developing Countries, 
Int’l Monetary Fund (Nov. 8, 2001), 
https://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/ib/2001/110801.htm (“Estimates of the gains from 
eliminating all barriers to merchandise trade range from US$250 billion to US$680 
billion per year.”). 
 20. See Nikil Saval, Globalisation: The Rise and Fall of an Idea that Swept the 
World, GUARDIAN (July 14, 2017, 12:28 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/14/globalisation-the-rise-and-fall-of-an-
idea-that-swept-the-world. 
 21. Id. 
 22. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1700 [hereinafter GATT]. 
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sought to expand international trade.23 The GATT resulted from a failed 
attempt to create the International Trade Organization (“ITO”), whose 
charter was to have a much broader scope, covering issues such as full 
employment, fair labor standards, commodity agreements, economic 
development, and restrictive business practices.24 However, fearing 
“incursions into US sovereignty and influenced by domestic business 
groups that objected to the ITO’s ‘exceptions to free market principles,’” 
Congress refused to ratify the ITO.25 As a result, the GATT, which 
focused narrowly on reducing tariffs, was left to govern trade.26 
The original signatories to the GATT were a group of like-minded, 
developed countries with market economies.27 The GATT benefitted 
these countries, as it provided a framework to negotiate lower tariffs and 
curtail protectionist measures.28 While the GATT did not completely ban 
tariffs, it attempted to do so through a “process of gradual reduction of 
tariffs on a country-by-country, product-by-product basis.”29 Article II of 
the GATT commits contracting parties to binding tariff ceilings, or 
“bound rates.”30 Once a country negotiates a new bound rate for a 
particular good or service, they may not increase that bound rate unless, 
through negotiation with other GATT members, they agree to further 
lower tariffs on other goods or services.31 In addition to these bound 
rates, the GATT requires that parties provide both national treatment, 
  
 23. See KRISTEN HOPEWELL, BREAKING THE WTO: HOW EMERGING POWERS 
DISRUPTED THE NEOLIBERAL PROJECT 42–43 (2016). 
 24. Id. at 43–44. 
 25. Id. at 44 (citing Robert E. Baldwin, Failure of the WTO Ministerial 
Conference at Cancun: Reasons and Remedies, 29 World Econ. 677, 679 (2006)). 
 26. Id. 
 27. The original signatories were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, 
Ceylon, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, 
United Kingdom and the United States. See Press Brief, WTO, Fiftieth Anniversary of 
the Multilateral Trading 
System,https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2020). 
 28. See Will Kenton, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, INVESTOPEDIA 
(June 28, 2018), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/general-agreement-on-tariffs-
and-trade-gaat.asp. 
 29. JOOST PAUWELYN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 181 (3d ed. 2016). 
 30. Id. at 183. 
 31. See GATT, supra note 22, art. XXVIII, at A71–72; PAUWELYN ET AL., supra 
note 29, at 186–87. 
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under Article III, and most favored nation (MFN) status, under Article I, 
to all other GATT members, as well as eliminate all quantitative 
restrictions on trade, such as import and export quotas.32  
National treatment forbids countries from enacting internal taxes or 
regulations on imported goods that do not also apply to similar and 
directly competitive or substitutable (“DCS”) domestic products.33 This 
means that if a country were to impose an internal tax on the sale of 
imported scotch, but not domestic bourbon, the tax would likely violate 
the GATT because scotch and bourbon are similar products.34 Similarly, 
the MFN principle requires member states to offer imports (and exports) 
the same treatment offered to any other country.35 For example, under the 
MFN principle, it would be GATT-inconsistent for Germany to apply a 
higher tariff, or impose any other less favorable treatment, on a product 
from China than is applied to a like product from the United States. 
Finally, Article XI forbids the use of any non-tariff barriers to trade.36 
The AB has interpreted Article XI broadly to include any state action 
other than tariffs that would disadvantage imports or exports.37 The 
principles laid out in the GATT remain in effect today for WTO member 
states, as the WTO adopted the GATT as part of its legal framework.38  
The rules set out under the GATT succeeded in encouraging countries 
to negotiate with each other to lower tariffs. Since the GATT went into 
effect in 1948, average tariffs are less than a tenth of what they were at 
the time of its enactment.39 
However, the GATT had one fatal flaw preventing it from truly being 
able to liberalize trade: its lack of a meaningful enforcement mechanism. 
While GATT members essentially agreed not to exceed their tariff bound 
  
 32. See GATT, supra note 22, art. I, III, XI. 
 33. Id. art. III. 
 34. See Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, at 31–32, 
WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996) 
(holding that vodka and shochu were similar products and that shochu and foreign liquors 
such as rum, whiskey, and gin were DCS, and therefore, Japan’s higher taxes on foreign 
liquors were GATT inconsistent). 
 35. GATT, supra note 22, art. I. 
 36. Id. art. XI. 
 37. PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 29, at 220. 
 38. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 
U.N.T.S. 190.  
 39. Fifty Years On, ECONOMIST (May 14, 1998), 
http://www.economist.com/node/128462. 
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rates and not to discriminate against other countries, a country could 
stray from its commitments without fear of punishment. Under the 
GATT system, respondents in a dispute settlement proceeding essentially 
had a veto that enabled losing parties to prevent the adoption of rulings 
against them.40 While losing parties generally adopted these rulings, the 
rulings did not mean that Member States always kept their 
commitments.41 Because the dispute panels were aware that a losing 
party could choose to block the adoption of a ruling, the panel had an 
incentive to rule in a somewhat more diplomatic way.42 Therefore, 
rulings were more lenient towards a country found violating the GATT 
because harsher pronouncements might have led to a country blocking 
adoption of a ruling.43 This resulted in countries eschewing the GATT 
dispute settlement system in favor of taking direct unilateral action 
against a party they believed violated GATT rules.44  
Thus, one of the major innovations of the WTO is a significantly 
strengthened dispute settlement system. The Dispute Settlement Body 
(“DSB”) automatically adopts decisions made by panels and the AB 
unless there is a consensus not to do so.45 The adoption of automatically 
implementing panel reports and AB decisions by “negative consensus” 
forecloses a country’s ability to block the DSB’s decisions and 
circumvent WTO law unilaterally.46 The DSB’s power to automatically 
impose its rulings on a country in non-compliance under the GATT 
eliminates the need for panels and the AB to be overly diplomatic 
  
 40. The System Under GATT 1947 and Its Evolution over the Years, WTO (Nov. 
2003), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c2s1p1_e.htm. 
 41. Historic Development of the WTO Dispute Settlement System, WTO (Nov. 
2003), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c2s1p1_e.htm. 
 42. The System Under GATT 1947 and Its Evolution over the Years, supra note 
40. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes arts.16(4), 17(14), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S 401, 411, 413 [hereinafter DSU]. 
 46. Major Changes in the Uruguay Round, WTO (Nov. 2003), 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c2s2p1_e.htm. 
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because the losing party in a dispute no longer has the power to block 
rulings unilaterally.47  
While the WTO’s revised governance system and expanded coverage 
has proven effective in ensuring contracting parties’ compliance with the 
GATT, it has the unfortunate effect of limiting countries from a 
sovereignty perspective. Parties to the WTO can no longer choose to 
adopt economic policies that are most beneficial to their country; they 
must instead make sure that their tariff systems, internal taxes, and 
regulations do not violate the GATT.48 Moreover, when a country does 
enact a policy that violates the GATT, it faces the suspension of benefits 
from the country claiming a violation of its rights under WTO law.49 
While it may only seem fair that a country that violates its obligations 
should face consequences for violating an agreement, the current 
structure of obligations is such that many long-term parties to the GATT 
and WTO are subject to much stricter obligations, while newer members 
have more policy space in which to adjust their tariffs.50 Those countries 
that were original signatories of the GATT made either bilateral or multi-
lateral concessions to each other when lowering tariffs and removing 
other trade barriers.51 Though new members may ultimately make some 
concessions in becoming signatories to the GATT, the MFN principle 
  
 47. PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 29, at 129. 
 48. See, e.g., Joann Ezeoba, The Rhetoric of Sovereignty in the WTO: How 
Sovereignty Can Impact State Conduct in the Dispute Settlement Framework, 7 
CREIGHTON INT’L & COMP. L.J. 182, 184-85 (2016) (discussing how the DSU is designed 
to reduce the sovereignty of WTO member States); Soyoung Jung, A State’s Sovereign 
Rights and Obligations in the WTO to Harmonize Environmental Policies, 21 MICH. ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 461, 470–72 (2013) (discussing how the WTO affects countries’ rights to 
implement national environmental and economic policies). 
 49. DSU, supra note 45, art. 22. 
 50. Bound Rate, Simple Mean, All Products (%), WORLD BANK, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.MRCH.BR.ZS (last visited Mar. 16, 2020) 
(The average tariff bound rate of long standing members of the WTO such as the United 
States, Japan, Canada, and EU members is generally below 5%, while the bound rates of 
many newer members of the WTO, especially those who would be classified as 
developing countries, have average bound rates of at least 10% and are often much 
higher. For example, Brazil’s average tariff bound rate exceeds 31%, and India’s exceeds 
50%).  
 51. See PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 29, at 89 (stating that while industrialized 
countries continued to negotiate lower tariffs and additional side agreements to the 
GATT, many contracting parties, particularly developing countries had bound relatively 
few of their tariff lines). 
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creates a strong incentive for new members to freeride on the 
concessions previously made by founding members.52 Thus, a country 
with higher tariff bound rates has little incentive to renegotiate lower 
tariff rates because developed countries, which often have the lowest 
tariff bound rates, must extend these tariff rates unconditionally, whether 
or not a particular country has reciprocally lowered its tariffs.53 For major 
exporting countries in the developing world, it makes little sense to 
reduce tariffs.54 The world’s major consumer markets are already those 
with the lowest tariffs.55 Those major export producing countries can, 
therefore, take advantage of the low tariffs in these markets, while still 
levying higher tariffs on imports from developed countries. 
Unsurprisingly, many of the countries whose economies have grown the 
fastest over the past few decades have been those benefitting from the 
MFN principle without having made equal tariff reductions themselves.56 
The following two figures show the GDP growth and the applied tariff 
rates of all products in three developing countries—China, Vietnam, and 
India—and three developed countries—the United States, Germany, and 
Japan.57 Note that the countries that experienced the greater growth in 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) from 1988 to 2016 were those countries 
that applied a higher mean tariff rate during that same period.58 
 
 
  
 52. Rodney D. Ludema & Anna Maria Mayda, Do Countries Free Ride on MFN? 
77 J. INT’L ECON. 137, 144 (2009) (suggesting that absent the MFN clause, tariff rates 
would be two thirds of their current level). 
 53. See GATT, supra note 22, art. I. 
 54. See Rodney D. Ludema & Anna Maria Mayda, Do Terms-of-Trade Effects 
Matter for Trade Agreements? Theory and Evidence from WTO Countries, 128 Q.J. 
ECON. 1837, 1844 (2013) (affirming that countries making unilateral tariff reductions 
have had very little success in getting other countries to lower their tariffs). 
 55. Compare The World Factbook – Imports, CIA, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/resources/the-world-
factbook/fields/242rank.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2020), with Bound Rate, Simple Mean, 
All Products (%), supra note 50. 
 56. See, e.g., Dani Rodrik, How to Save Globalization from Its Cheerleaders 2 
(Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Working Paper No. RWP07-038, 2007), 
https://drodrik.scholar.harvard.edu/files/dani-rodrik/files/how-to-save-globalization-
from-cheerleaders.pdf. 
 57. Infra notes 58–59 and accompanying graphic figures. 
 58. Infra notes 58–59 and accompanying graphic figures. 
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Figure 3. GDP growth from 1988 to 201659 
  
  
 59. World Development Indicators: GDP Growth, WORLD BANK,  (last visited 
Mar. 16, 2020). 
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Figure 4. Tariff Rates Applied, Simple Mean, All Products (%)60 
 
  
  
 60. World Development Indicators: Tariff Rate, Applied, Simple Mean, All 
Products, WORLD BANK, 
http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=TM.TAX.MRCH.SM.
AR.ZS&country=CHN,VNM,USA,DEU,IND,JPN (last visited Mar. 16, 2020). 
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This has led developed countries such as the United States and members 
of the European Union to negotiate bi-lateral and multi-lateral FTAs in 
order to gain concessions they cannot get through the WTO.61 Some 
observers see this proliferation of FTAs as detrimental to the poorest 
people in developing countries.62 Others view these trade agreements as 
benefitting the interests of large corporations at the expense of the 
working class in developed countries.63 
B. The WTO, the Environment, and Sovereignty 
A majority of the early WTO jurisprudence centered on trade and 
environment.64 This was the result of a rise in political concern for the 
environment65 combined with the WTO’s lack of any specific agreement 
dealing with the environment.66 Though the WTO lacks any specific 
environmental agreement, GATT Article XX provides a number of 
exceptions relating to environmental protection.67 In particular, Article 
XX(b)—measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life—and 
  
 61. Spread of Free Trade Agreements Threatens Poor Countries, OXFAM (Mar. 
19, 2007), https://www.oxfamamerica.org/press/spread-of-free-trade-agreements-
threatens-poor-countries/. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See David Korten, What If Trade Agreements Helped People, Not 
Corporations?, YES! MAG. (June 1, 2016), http://www.yesmagazine.org/new-
economy/what-if-trade-agreements-helped-people-not-corporations-20160601 (noting 
that existing and proposed free trade agreements benefit corporate interests at the expense 
of democracy and the environment); Zaid Jilani, Despite What Media Says, TPP Isn’t 
About Free Trade—It’s About Protecting Corporate Profits, INTERCEPT (July 5, 2016, 
10:25 AM), https://theintercept.com/2016/07/05/despite-what-media-says-tpp-isnt-about-
free-trade-its-about-helping-corporations/. 
 64. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of 
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Nov. 6, 
1998) [hereinafter US–Shrimp]; Appellate Body Report, United States – Measures 
Concerning the Importation, Marketing, and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS381/AB/R (adopted June 13, 2012). 
 65. JEFFREY FRANKEL & PETER ORSZAG, RETROSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC POLICY IN THE 1990’S 3 (2001), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/20011102.pdf. 
 66. The Environment: A Specific Concern, WTO, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/bey2_e.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 
2020). 
 67. GATT, supra note 22, art. XX. 
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Article XX(g)—measures relating to the conservation of exhaustible 
natural resources—are GATT consistent so long as they are “not applied 
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination” or “a disguised restriction on international trade.”68 
However, the lack of clarity in how to interpret Article XX made it 
unclear what kind of trade-restrictive environmental regulations and 
taxes a country could enact. 
The newly established DSB chose to interpret the Article XX 
exceptions very narrowly, requiring that a country’s policy falls within 
the range of policy exceptions allowed by the GATT and that the 
measure be applied in conformity with the requirements of the 
introductory clause of Article XX, or the chapeau.69 As this Article 
discusses in Part IV, the chapeau requires that a measure not be applied 
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable 
discrimination, or a disguised restriction on international trade; the 
requirement has proven difficult to comply with, severely limiting the 
ability of a country to exercise sovereignty over its domestic policies.70 
The leading case in interpreting the chapeau is United States – Import 
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“US–Shrimp”).71 
The measure at issue was a United States regulation requiring shrimp to 
be caught with “turtle excluder devices” (“TEDs”) in order to be 
imported into the United States.72 India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Thailand 
argued that the ban on shrimp caught without TEDs violated GATT 
Articles I , XI, and XIII.73 The United States conceded that the measure 
was enacted in violation of the GATT but argued that it qualified as an 
exception under Article XX(g).74 The AB held that the measure 
amounted to both unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination.75 The AB 
  
 68. Id. 
 69. Panel Report, United States – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional 
Gasoline, WTO Doc. WT/DS2/R (adopted May 20, 1996) [hereinafter US–Gasoline 
Panel]. 
 70. GATT, supra note 22, art. XX; Sanford Gaines, The WTO’s Reading of the 
GATT Article XX Chapeau: A Disguised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. 
PA. J. INT’L L. 739, 777, 806, 845 (2001). 
 71. US–Shrimp, supra note 64. PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 29, at 394. 
 72. PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 29, at 395. 
 73. Id. at 396. 
 74. Id.  
 75. US–Shrimp, supra note 64, at ¶ 184. 
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reasoned that measures conditioning market access on adoption of a 
particular regulatory program, lack of negotiating agreements in good 
faith, and inequitable phase-in periods for different countries were 
indicative of unjustifiable discrimination, while a measure’s rigidity, 
inflexibility, and lack of adequate due process constituted arbitrary 
discrimination.76 Thus, the AB held that the United States regulations 
qualified as valid Article XX(g) exceptions when the United States later 
engaged in good faith treaty negotiations with other shrimp harvesting 
countries, amended their guidelines on shrimp harvesting to be more 
flexible, and allowed the importation of shrimp from countries with 
regulatory programs, which were comparable in effectiveness.77 
Because WTO panels and the AB have continued to interpret the 
“chapeau” restrictively, domestic regulations predicated on Article XX 
defenses must be careful not to impose extra-jurisdictional 
implementation or apply differently between countries, and it must be 
flexible and allow for a transparent decision-making process, as well as 
not simply being a disguised restriction on international trade.  
C. A Power Shift 
Coinciding with the formation of the WTO was a shift in power from 
developed countries to the emerging developing world.78 Brazil and India 
led this power shift, which gained even more momentum following 
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.79 Thus, the Doha Round, the 
current round of WTO trade negotiations, has become “a clash between 
the old powers—the US and EU—and the new— Brazil, India, and 
China.”80  
Whereas developing countries were forced into accepting many of the 
trade agreements in the Uruguay Round, the ascendance of China, India, 
and Brazil has been profound.81 These three countries now drive the 
Doha Round’s agenda, and it is likely that no trade deal can be secured at 
  
 76. See id. at ¶¶ 181–84. 
 77. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain 
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, – Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 152–
53, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Nov. 21, 2001). 
 78. HOPEWELL, supra note 23, at 1. 
 79. See id. at 77, 80, 93. 
 80. Id. at 98. 
 81. See id. at 99–100. 
708 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 28.3 
the WTO without the assent of these countries.82 Furthermore, these 
countries have become some of “the most active and frequent users of 
the WTO dispute settlement system.”83 As of 2016, Brazil, India, and 
China brought a combined total of twenty-eight trade disputes against the 
United States and nineteen against the European Union.84  
This shift in power—the result of both the increased economic power 
of the developing world and a refusal to have trade terms mandated by 
the “global north”—has resulted in increased wariness of free trade by 
those in developed countries. Industries affected by an influx of 
relatively cheap competing products have blamed unfair competition 
from developing countries as the reason for their woes, and politicians 
have seized on these fears as that public opinion in favor of free trade has 
waned.85 
Exacerbating concerns about this power shift has been China’s 
Protocol of Accession.86 From 2001, when China was admitted to the 
WTO, until 2007, the United States imports from China tripled, the 
United States’ trade deficit ballooned from $84 billion to $274 billion in 
the same period.87 Likewise, China’s share of exports to the European 
Union nearly doubled, while in Latin America its share grew from 2.6% 
in 2000 to 12.5% by 2009.88 As Harvard Law Professor Mark Wu has 
argued, the WTO is “struggling to adjust to a rising China.”89 As Wu 
maintains, WTO law is not suitable for the intricacies of an economy like 
China’s, in which it is difficult to determine whether a corporate entity is 
an extension of the state.90 
  
 82. Id. at 79. 
 83. Id. at 103. 
 84. Id.  
 85. See POLITICO & HARV. T.H. CHAN SCH. PUB. HEALTH, AMERICANS’ VIEWS ON 
CURRENT TRADE AND HEALTH POLICIES 3 (2016), 
https://www.politico.com/f/?id=00000157-58ef-d502-ad5f-dbef0b4f0000 (85% of 
Republicans believe that free trade has lost more jobs than it has created). 
 86. Protocol on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China, WTO Doc. 
WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001). 
 87. HOPEWELL, supra note 23, at 133. 
 88. Rhys Jenkins & Alexandre de Freitas Barbosa, Fear for Manufacturing? 
China and the Future of Industry in Brazil and Latin America, 209 CHINA Q. 59, 65 
(2012). 
 89. Mark Wu, The “China, Inc.” Challenge to Global Trade Governance, 57 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 261, 264 (2016). 
 90. Id. at 264–65. 
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The question of whether or not China is a true “market economy” has 
come to a head with the expiration of provisions of China’s Accession 
Protocol mandating it to be treated as a non-market economy.91 In 
particular, the amorphous character of major Chinese corporations and 
banks makes it difficult to determine whether other WTO Member States 
may retaliate against Chinese products subsidized by these institutions.92 
Likewise, WTO anti-dumping laws—which allow a country to impose 
additional duties when foreign producers unload products in an export 
market at a cheaper price than they sell products at domestically, and the 
“dumping” causes or threatens to cause injury to a domestic producer—
will be harder to apply if China is automatically granted “market 
economy” status at the WTO.93 The WTO has not yet ruled on whether 
or not China is a “market economy” now that the Accession Protocol has 
expired.94 These issues have caused some commentators in the West to 
advocate for moving beyond the WTO in dealing with China.95  
  
 91. See David Lawder, U.S. Formally Opposes China Market Status at WTO, 
REUTERS (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-trade-wto/u-s-
formally-opposes-china-market-economy-status-at-wto-idUSKBN1DU2VH. 
 92. See Appellate Body Report, United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, ¶ 611, WTO Doc. 
WT/DS379/AB/R (adopted Mar. 25, 2011) (holding that subsidies Chinese owned banks 
and state-owned enterprises were not per se actionable subsidies); Wu, supra note 89, at 
301–05. 
 93. See GATT, supra note 22, art. VI. 
 94. See Douglas Bulloch, China is Not a Market Economy, and the WTO Won’t 
Survive Recognizing it as Such, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2017, 4:01 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/douglasbulloch/2017/12/08/china-is-not-a-market-
economy-and-the-wto-wont-survive-recognising-it-as-such/#e775c9937fc6 (arguing that 
if the WTO recognizes China as a market economy, it runs the risk of the US choosing to 
unilaterally exercise powers that “may undermine the centrality of the WTO to world 
trade”). 
 95. See Clyde Prestowitz, China’s Not Breaking the Rules. It’s Playing a 
Different Game, FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 17, 2012, 4:24 PM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/17/chinas-not-breaking-the-rules-its-playing-a-
different-game/; Wu, supra note 89, at 267. 
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III. WHO ARE THE “WINNERS” AND “LOSERS” IN THE WTO? 
President Trump likes to characterize groups as “winning” or “losing” 
international agreements.96 As noted above, economists have traditionally 
assumed that trade liberalization would be beneficial to all parties 
involved, creating a system that would produce only “winners” in the 
long run.97 However, President Trump is not alone in viewing the United 
States as “losing” from its commitments in both the WTO and other 
FTAs.98 Harvard economist Dani Rodrik has long asserted that free trade 
would result in an uneven distribution of gains and, in some cases, actual 
declines in standard of living for certain segments of society.99 Others, 
like Larry Summers, the former chief economist of the World Bank, and 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman have retreated from their 
beliefs that free trade is beneficial to everyone.100 If President Trump and 
these economists are correct that free trade creates both “winners” and 
“losers,” who exactly has gained the most from the liberalization of 
trade? 
A. The Elephant in the Room 
If, as most economists have posited, free trade is beneficial to all 
countries, and by extension, their citizens, we should see a general 
increase in real income in all countries and socio-economic strata. 
However, recent studies have shown this is not so. Branko Milanovic’s 
famous “Elephant Chart” shows that while real income has increased 
rapidly for much of the world since 1988, trade liberalization has not 
benefitted certain segments of the world’s population.101 
 
  
 96. Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade, TIME (June 28, 2016, 4:55 PM), 
https://time.com/4386335/donald-trump-trade-speech-transcript/ (stating that in 
discussing increasing tariffs, President Trump said, “You already have a trade war, and 
we’re losing badly”).  
 97. PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 29, at 44. 
 98. Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Trade, supra note 96.  
 99. See, e.g., RODRIK, THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX, supra note 11, at 56. 
 100. See Saval, supra note 20. 
 101. Milanovic, supra note 11, at 12–15. 
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Figure 5 Cumulative Real Income Growth Between 1988 and 2008 102  
 
  
As Figure 5 shows, while much of the world has experienced 
unprecedented growth in real income, those situated between the 75th 
and 90th percentiles of global income distribution have experienced 
relatively stagnant growth, and, in some cases, an actual decline.103 This 
group, represented by Point B in Figure 5, is mainly comprised of 
citizens of developed countries. Seven out of ten people at that point are 
from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(“OECD”) countries.104 These people belong to the lower half of their 
countries’ income distributions, since many rich countries’ income 
distributions begin around the 70th percentile of global income 
distribution—and in the case of especially rich countries, at the 80th 
percentile.105 
  
 102. This graph’s y-axis shows the percentage growth in real income between 
years 1988 and 2008. Branko Milanovic, The Greatest Reshuffle of Individual Incomes 
Since the Industrial Revolution, fig. 1, VOX EU (July 1, 2016), 
http://voxeu.org/article/greatest-reshuffle-individual-incomes-industrial-revolution. 
 103. Milanovic, supra note 11, at 13. 
 104. Milanovic, supra note 102. 
 105. Id. 
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Contrast the stagnation in the top quarter of global income distribution 
with the growth at Point A, where growth in real income has been 
between 70% and 80%.106 Between the 50th and 60th percentile of the 
global income distribution sits the middle class of the emerging market 
economies—citizens of China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, and Egypt.107 
Similarly, “those at the bottom third of the global income distribution 
have also [seen] significant gains, with real incomes rising” between 
40% and 70%.108 
Looking at this disparity from an egalitarian point of view, one might 
welcome greater real income growth for the citizens of traditionally poor 
countries. Indeed, one’s country of birth is the greatest indicator of one’s 
real income;109 faster growth at the lower-half of the income distribution 
should lessen income inequality between citizens in developed countries 
and developing countries.  
However, the massive increase in real income of the top global 1%, 
and to a lesser extent, the top 5% has overshadowed whatever decrease 
in inequality that has been achieved between points A and B on the 
“Elephant Chart.”110 Between 1988 and 2008, the top 1% saw its real 
income increase by more than 60%.111  
B. The Winners 
As the “Elephant Chart” suggests, the winners of increased 
globalization and trade liberalization have been the top global 5% and 
the middle class of emerging market economies, China and India in 
particular. While traditional trade theory explains why gains in real 
income have been achieved in concert with trade liberalization, there has 
  
 106. Milanovic, supra note 11, at 12. 
 107. Id. (“[B]etween the 50th and 60th percentile of the global income distribution 
[are] 200 million Chinese, 90 million Indians, and about 30 million people each from 
Indonesia, Brazil and Egypt.”). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Branko Milanovic, Global Inequality: From Class to Location, from 
Proletarians to Migrants 7 (World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 5820, 
2011) (“[Economic Inequality] has become preponderantly an inequality determined by 
location only.”). 
 110. See Milanovic, supra note 11, at 14. These percentages refer to the wealthiest 
1% and 5% of the world’s population. Id. 
 111. Id. at 12. 
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been little focus on the conditions that have allowed such disparate 
groups to flourish while other groups stagnated.  
It is not mere coincidence that the populations that benefit most from 
globalization are the world’s richest and those in rapidly developing 
countries. The supply of cheap labor in developing countries has given 
corporations incentives to outsource both labor and service jobs. The 
result is beneficial to both, as developing countries are provided with 
relatively higher-paying jobs, while corporations are provided with a 
cheaper source of labor. 
1. The Current Rules of Free Trade Benefit the World’s 
Richest 
The Global 1% consists of about sixty million people, over half of 
which are Americans.112 In addition to the richest 12% of Americans, the 
Global 1% is composed of the richest 3-6% of Britons, Japanese, 
Germans, and French.113 While the richest 1% of other European 
countries, Brazil, Russia, and South Africa, and the very wealthy in 
developing countries, are included in the top percentile, it is still very 
much a “club” composed of the “old rich” world—western Europe, 
northern America, and Japan.114  
In 2008, the threshold for being in the global top 1% was [$]45,000 . . . 
per person per year which, translated into a traditional family structure 
of two partners and two children, implies an after-tax income of 
$180,000 (or, using the approximate tax rates of rich countries, a 
before-tax income of more than $300,000).
115
  
In other words, the world’s richest people are not among those 
suffering from the distributional effects of globalization.116 The United 
  
 112. Id. at 14. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Milanovic, supra note 102. 
 116. OECD, DIVIDED WE STAND: WHY INEQUALITY KEEPS RISING 28–29 (2011), 
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/the-causes-of-growing-
inequalities-in-oecd-countries_9789264119536-en (observing that global integration and 
technological progress have brought highly skilled workers greater rewards than low-
skilled workers); see also Holger Görg, Globalization, Offshoring and Jobs, in MAKING 
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States and other developed countries have lowered tariffs and other 
protections on commercial services, such as banking, finance, 
transportation, telecommunications, consulting, advertising, 
entertainment, health care, construction, and utilities.117 Since developed 
countries tend to have a comparative advantage in these fields, 
outsourcing is less of a risk, and thus, the rich and upper-middle class in 
developed countries have been among the prime beneficiaries of 
globalization.118 
But corporate interests have been, and remain, the biggest beneficiary 
of globalization and liberalized trade.119 Multinational corporations 
(“MNCs”) have “no sentimental ties to family, community, or even to 
any given [country], because they are not real people and their 
stockholders may be located anywhere on the globe.”120 Profit, not 
people, is the driver behind these companies. Reducing trade barriers 
allows corporations to both outsource labor when domestic labor 
becomes too expensive and import source materials and intermediate 
goods from countries that produce them at a comparative advantage.121 
As this Article discusses below, while the theory of comparative 
advantage posits that this movement in production should be beneficial 
to all, these benefits have mainly fell into the hands of powerful 
corporate interests and the world’s richest citizens. Foreign Direct 
Investment (“FDI”) in undeveloped and developing countries stunts the 
  
GLOBALIZATION SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE 21, 31–37 (Marc Bacchetta & Marion Jansen 
eds., 2011), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/glob_soc_sus_e.pdf (pointing to 
studies that show services offshoring has mild negative effects on employment of 
workers in low-skilled occupations, but positive effects on high-skilled occupations). 
 117. See HOPEWELL, supra note 23, at 57. 
 118. HOPEWELL, supra note 23, at 57. 
 119. See The Threat of Globalization, GLOBAL POL’Y F., 
https://www.globalpolicy.org/globalization/defining-globalization/47948-the-threat-of-
globalization.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2020). 
 120. John Ikerd, The Cost and Benefit of Globalization: Who Are the 
Beneficiaries?, COUNCIL ON AFR. SEC. & DEV. (Jan. 4, 2020), http://www.casade.org/the-
cost-and-benefit-of-globalization-who-are-the-beneficiaries/. 
 121. See U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Global Supply Chains: 
Trade and Economic Policies for Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. 
UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/56 4, 7 (2013), 
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/itcdtab56_en.pdf (showing global trade in 
intermediate goods has rapidly expanded since the birth of the WTO). 
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growth of domestic firms.122 MNCs, while providing jobs, pocket a 
majority of profits.123 Foreign investors take out these profits and return 
them to the multinational’s home country—often a developed 
country124—and thus developing states are left worse off than if domestic 
corporations or the state owned the means of production.125 MNCs are 
also often given favorable treatment: “tax holidays, exemptions from 
import duties, the provision of land for facilities, and the offer of direct 
subsidies.”126 
2. China and India’s Middle Classes Are Winning, but for 
How Long? 
The second group of beneficiaries of global trade has been the middle 
class in developing countries, particularly in China and India. Since 
1960, the share of global GDP produced by developed countries has 
dropped from 80% to 44%.127 Three developing countries, China, India, 
  
 122. See Ari Kokko & Tran Toan Thang, Foreign Direct Investment and the 
Survival of Domestic Private Firms in Viet Nam, 31 ASIAN DEV. REV. 53, 82–84 (2014) 
(finding that increased FDI makes domestic firms more vulnerable in Vietnam); Heiwei 
Tang, Spillovers from Foreign Direct Investment in China: The Role of Ownership 27 
(Apr. 13, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.hwtang.com/uploads/3/0/7/2/3072318/paper2final_hwtang.pdf (finding that 
FDI is associated with lower domestic productivity in the same sector in China). 
 123. See Duncan Green, $2 Leaving Developing Countries for Every $1 Going in – 
Big New Report on the State of Global Financial Flows, OXFAM BLOG (Dec. 18, 2014), 
https://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/twice-as-much-leaving-poor-countries-as-is-going-in-big-
new-report-on-the-state-of-global-financial-flows/ (analyzing that for every 44 cents of 
FDI invested in a country, 42 cents in profit is taken out by financial investors). 
 124. Three-hundred-sixteen of the Global 500 companies come from nine “rich” 
countries. Global 500 2017, FORTUNE, https://fortune.com/global500/2017/ (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2020). 
 125. See Dirk H. M. Akkermans, Net Profit Flow Per Country from 1980 to 2009: 
The Long-Term Effects of Foreign Direct Investment, PLOS ONE, June 27, 2017, at 2–3, 
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0179244 (stating that 
FDI benefits “core” countries, or developed countries, at the long-term expense of 
developing countries, and FDI has only benefitted owners of capital in the “core” 
countries, not workers); Tang, supra note 122, at 1–2. (finding that FDI is associated with 
lower domestic productivity in the same sector in China). 
 126. Rui Moura & Rosa Forte, The Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on the 
Host Country Economic Growth - Theory and Empirical Evidence 1 (July 2009) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2009/papers/forte.pdf. 
 127. HOPEWELL, supra note 23, at 1. 
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and Brazil, now account for 25% of the global economy, nearly matching 
the entire production of G7 economies, which make up 33% of the global 
economy.128  
As mentioned above, the middle class in these countries has seen their 
real incomes increase by the largest percentage since 1988—between 
70% and 80%.129 While this remarkable growth is due to a number of 
factors,130 the opening of their markets to international trade has played a 
vital role in increasing real incomes and raising standards of living.131 
This is, of course, the biggest success story of globalization. Both 
proponents and detractors of economic globalization agree that raising 
people out of poverty is one of the most important political issues.132 
However, as this Article discusses below, while globalization may have 
contributed to escaping an arbitrarily defined poverty, living conditions 
for many in these countries still remain far below those of citizens in 
developed countries.133 Thus, while outsourcing may lead to an 
increasing number of jobs for people in developing countries, as well as 
increased wages, it does not necessarily mean that their standard of living 
has improved by a meaningful degree.134 As wages increase in quickly 
developing countries such as China, there are even fears that 
corporations will begin outsourcing to poorer countries where wages 
have not yet risen.135 
  
 128. Id. 
 129. See Milanovic, supra note 11, at 12. 
 130. State investment has also been a primary factor in the economic growth of 
these countries. See John Ross, Why Are China and India Growing So Fast? State 
Investment, HUFFPOST (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/china-india-
growth_b_11655472. 
 131. See HOPEWELL, supra note 23, at 127–33, 149–55. 
 132. See WORLD BANK GRP. & WTO, THE ROLE OF TRADE IN ENDING POVERTY 7 
(2015), https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/worldbankandwto15_e.pdf; 
Workers’ Rights, OXFAM AUSTL., https://www.oxfam.org.au/whats-wrong-with-world-
trade/ (last visited Apr. 20, 2020). 
 133. Infra Part III.C.1. 
 134. See Workers’ Rights, supra note 132. 
 135. Sophia Yan, ‘Made in China’ Isn’t So Cheap Anymore, and That Could Spell 
Headache for Beijing, CNBC (Feb. 27, 2017, 12:37 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/27/chinese-wages-rise-made-in-china-isnt-so-cheap-
anymore.html (observing that average hourly wages in China have spiked 64% since 
2011, translating to higher manufacturing costs for companies, but there is fear that these 
jobs could be outsourced to countries like India or Sri Lanka where wages are more than 
five times lower). 
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C. The Losers 
The “losers” of free trade fall into two diverse camps, united perhaps 
by their lack of political clout on both a global and national scale. The 
first of these groups, the “absolute poor,” or poorest 5% of the world’s 
population,136 are undoubtedly the biggest losers in the current trade 
regime. During the same period in which the median global real income 
rose 80%, the real incomes of the poorest 5% remained the same.137 The 
second group are the constituents of the “global upper-middle class,” 
those whose real income falls between the 75th and 90th percentiles of 
the global income distribution.138 This segment of the world population 
includes many from former Communist countries, Latin America, and 
citizens of developed countries whose incomes stagnated.139 Increased 
international trade is at the root of these stagnating incomes.140 
1. The “Absolute Poor” 
Proponents of free trade often point to statistics that shows as tariffs 
and trade barriers have fallen, the rate of world poverty has decreased.141 
While this is true—the World Bank estimates that nearly 1.1 billion 
people have moved out of poverty since 1990—the decrease in poverty 
was mainly realized in a handful of countries, primarily by those living 
in urban areas.142 Furthermore, the World Bank’s definition of poverty—
  
 136. See Milanovic, supra note 11, at 12. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 13. 
 139. Id. 
 140. For a detailed account of how increased trade between developed countries 
and developing countries, see JOSH BIVENS, USING STANDARD MODELS TO BENCHMARK 
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(2013), https://www.epi.org/files/2013/standard-models-benchmark-costs-
globalization.pdf. 
 141. See e.g., WORLD BANK GRP. & WTO, supra note 132, at 7; IMF ET AL., 
MAKING TRADE AND ENGINE OF GROWTH FOR ALL: THE CASE FOR TRADE AND FOR 
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AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2015/10/01/if-youre-anti-poverty-you-
should-be-pro-free-trade-and-globalisation/#1b61f6d51d62. 
 142. See Nina Pavcnik, Dossier: Is Protectionism the Solution? Benefits and Costs 
of Free Trade for Less Developed Countries, BOOKS & IDEAS (Nov. 5, 2009), 
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those people living on less than $1.90 per day—does not fully inform 
one of the economic conditions that many living in third world countries 
face.143 Even someone making ten times that amount would still qualify 
as impoverished in developed countries.144 One way to see this is by 
comparing the United States second income decile with the Chinese 
urban eighth income decile.145 While the real income of the United States 
second decile has increased by about 20% since 1988, China’s urban 
eighth decile has increased by a factor of 6.5.146 Despite this, Americans 
at the second income decile still have a higher real income.147 Thus, 
while the trend in economic globalization may have lifted some above an 
arbitrary poverty line, it has not necessarily improved their standard of 
living in any appreciable way.148  
Stated differently, even people living in countries that have 
experienced noticeable economic improvement over the last few 
decades, particularly those 1.1 billion people who have moved out of 
poverty, have only minimally improved their standard of living. One 
study found only two countries where the “average beneficiary jumped 
  
http://www.booksandideas.net/Benefits-and-costs-of-free-trade.html#nb3 (“[P]overty 
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BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview (last updated Apr. 16, 2020) 
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population lived on less than $1.90 a day, down from 36% in 1990). 
 143. See Poverty, supra note 142. 
 144. See Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., 
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 145. Branko Milanovic, Winners of Globalization: The Rich and the Chinese 
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 146. Id. at 80–81. 
 147. Id. at 80. 
 148. See Raju Jan Singh, Evidence that Trade Does Reduce Poverty, but Only if 
the Conditions Are Right, WORLD BANK (Feb. 19, 2013), 
http://blogs.worldbank.org/trade/evidence-that-trade-does-reduce-poverty-but-only-if-
the-conditions-are-right. As even World Bank economists have noted, trade only tends to 
reduce poverty in specific settings: “in countries where financial sectors are deep, 
education levels high, and governance strong.” Id. 
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from less than $1.88 to more than $2.13: Pakistan and Thailand.”149 The 
average beneficiary in every other country made only minor jumps 
within that range.150  
Proponents of free trade also make the mistake of pointing to states 
with an abundance of protectionist policies as beacons of free trade. 
South Korea and Taiwan are viewed as shining examples of the benefits 
of trade liberalization when, in fact, these states became international 
trading powers using “government subsidies and heavy investment in 
infrastructure and skills development while being protected from 
competition by overseas firms.”151 Unsurprisingly, in recent years, 
countries that have reduced levels of poverty by increasing economic 
growth—China, Vietnam, India, and Mozambique—have “all had high 
levels of intervention as part of an overall policy of strengthening 
domestic sectors.”152 
Meanwhile, many other developing countries have not been able to 
capitalize by liberalizing trade because they do not have the 
infrastructure to compete with highly efficient producers such as 
China.153 In Zambia and Ghana, the opening up of markets led to sudden 
falls in growth rates as domestic industry was unable to compete with 
foreign goods.154 Even in countries that have experienced economic 
growth from liberalizing their markets, poverty has not necessarily 
decreased.155 After Mexico joined NAFTA, it experienced economic 
growth, “yet the number of people living below the poverty line 
increased by 14 million in the 10 years from the mid-1980s.”156 This 
  
 149. Ian Fletcher & Jeff Ferry, Free Trade Isn’t Helping World Poverty, 
HUFFPOST (May 25, 2011), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/free-trade-isnt-helping-
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 150. See id. 
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GUARDIAN (May 19, 2003, 11:19 AM), 
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 153. See Adrian Wood & Jörg Mayer, Has China De-Industrialized Other 
Developing Nations?, VOX EU (July 28, 2009), http://voxeu.org/article/has-china-de-
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 154. Byers, supra note 151. 
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occurred because the gains of liberalized trade went primarily to large 
commercial operators.157 
2. The “Global Upper-Middle Class” 
Just as the poorest of the world’s population have been excluded from 
the fruits of increased global trade, so too have the poorest citizens in 
developed countries. Predictably, these people are often those who had 
been employed in industries that moved their operations to developing 
countries, such as those in manufacturing.158 The decreased labor demand 
in developed countries led to falling wages and income stagnation.159 
The middle and working classes have primarily borne the brunt of this 
income stagnation.160 In the United States, real household income for 
those in the 4th quintile declined by 2.2% from 2000 to 2017, while 
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 158. See Greg Jericho, Free Trade Is Viewed as Economic Catnip, but the Benefits 
Are Not for Everyone, GUARDIAN (July 10, 2016, 8:53 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/grogonomics/2016/jul/11/there-are-economic-
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us-32-million-jobs-since-2001 (explaining that from 2001 to 2011, the United States 
workers who were directly displaced by trade with China lost a collective $37 billion in 
wages as a result of accepting other lower paying jobs, and of the jobs lost to outsourcing 
to China, over two-thirds were in manufacturing). 
 159. See Jay Shambaugh & Ryan Nunn, Why Wages Aren’t Growing in America, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 24, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/why-wages-arent-growing-in-
america (arguing that adequate labor demand help to combat income stagnation). 
 160. See ELISE GOULD, WHY AMERICA’S WORKERS NEED FASTER WAGE 
GROWTH—AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 4 (2014), 
https://www.epi.org/files/2014/why-americas-workers-need-faster-wage-growth-final.pdf 
(finding that the real hourly wage of American workers at the 50th wage percentile has 
increased by only 6.1% since 1980, and real hourly wages have decreased by 5.3% for 
workers at the 10th percentile) (comparing this with an increase of 40.6% for those in the 
95th wage percentile). 
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income for the bottom quintile decreased by 9.4%.161 Further, since 2007, 
the real hourly wages of 70% of Americans fell.162 One study found that 
from 2005 and 2014, between 65% and 70% of people in the twenty-five 
richest western countries saw their incomes stagnate.163 These numbers 
range from a stagnation level as high as 97% of Italian households to a 
low of 20% in Sweden.164 In Australia, “while GDP per capita has grown 
by [nearly 10%], real net national disposable income per capita has fallen 
by about [2%]” since 2008, showing that real incomes have stagnated, if 
not declined.165 Since the mid-1980s in OECD countries, the average 
income of the richest 10% of the population has grown to nine times that 
of the poorest 10%, as incomes for top earners have grown 46% faster 
than that of the lowest earners.166 
While multiple factors have contributed to declining and stagnating 
wages, “international trade has been a clear factor suppressing wages in 
the middle of the [United States’] wage structure . . . particularly since 
1995.”167 While trade agreements provide protections for corporate 
interests, they “generally provide[] no protection against a race to the 
bottom on labor standards.”168 “Falling prices for import-competing 
production will (all else equal) reduce the wages paid to workers . . . in 
import-competing sectors,” as well as those “who resemble the workers 
in import-competing sectors in important aspects such as education and 
work experience.”169 A study by McKinsey & Company found that 
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between 1980 and 2010, eighty-five million workers in emerging 
economies joined the low-and-medium skill labor force in export-related 
activities.170 Thus, it is little surprise that increased international trade 
“affects wages through its influence on [the relative] bargaining power of 
different groups of workers.”171 The threat of relocating jobs to other 
countries has shifted bargaining power to corporate interests and 
weakened unions.172 
D. The Problem 
While trade liberalization creates additional wealth—as evidenced by 
the over 20% mean growth in real income between 1988 and 2008173—
the “absolute poor” and the “global upper-middle class,” have seen little 
or none of the benefits of globalization.174 These distributional effects are 
at odds with traditional theories of trade, which theorize that liberalized 
trade should have net beneficial effects on all actors.175 The problem, 
therefore, is continuing to capture the economic gains of globalization, 
while balancing two oft-competing goals: (1) ensuring that all world 
citizens have access to these gains, and (2) a country’s duty to maximize 
its own citizens’ prosperity.176 
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Traditional theories of trade have tended to neglect the effects of trade 
on employment levels.177 These traditional models, such as the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model, rely on the assumption that perfectly 
competitive labor markets exist.178  
However, in the real world, there can be no reliance on a perfectly 
competitive labor market or an assumption of full employment. With this 
in mind, imagine a trade regime, in which two countries, A and B, have 
the infrastructure to manufacture shoes. Each country has 100 workers 
capable of making shoes. However, Country A, a developed country, has 
a minimum wage of $10 per hour, while Country B, a developing 
country, can pay its workers $2 an hour to make shoes of equal quality at 
the same pace as workers in Country A. Each worker can make two pairs 
of shoes for every hour worked and a pair of shoes sells for $50.  
In each country, a shoe manufacturer will be able to produce 200 pairs 
of shoes each hour, which at $50 per pair would generate sales of 
$10,000. However, while Country B is able to produce the 200 shoes for 
a mere $200, in Country A, the labor costs rise to $1,000. The shoe 
manufacturer will be able to save $800 in labor costs per hour. 
Figure 6. Labor Costs and Net Profit in Country A and Country B Per 
Hour 
 Gross Product Labor Costs Net Profit 
Country A $10,000 $1,000 $9,000 
Country B $10,000 $200 $9,800 
 
Under such circumstances, it would be more efficient for the 
manufacturer to open the shoe factory in Country B—he saves $800 each 
hour. Country B is more efficient, and according to the theory of 
comparative advantage, Country A should focus on producing another 
product.  
Unfortunately for the workers in Country A, there is not always an 
alternative to work at the shoe factory. If the only products that Country 
A can produce at a comparative advantage are those that require highly 
skilled labor, these workers may not have the opportunity to rejoin the 
labor market. Thus, if the shoe factory in Country A were forced to close 
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because it would no longer be competitive with shoe factories in Country 
B, the employees in those factories would have to search for a new job. 
Many of these employees likely have a limited skillset, so if there is no 
latent demand for unskilled labor in the area, these employees will either 
join the ranks of the unemployed or be forced to move, something that 
many people cannot do, whether for personal or financial reasons.179 
Coinciding with the globalization trend has been an era of rapid 
technological change and innovation. Technical change puts pressure on 
the wages of unskilled laborers where it is more efficient to have 
machines do work than humans. Consider how McDonald’s responded to 
strikes by workers demanding higher wages. Instead of caving to labor’s 
demands, McDonald’s threatened to install touchscreen kiosks that, 
while requiring greater capital output in the short-term, would be cheaper 
long-term.180 In the past, such technological change often led to what 
economists call a J-curve: as new technology increases productivity, it 
leads to higher wages as jobs in new sectors are created by this increased 
productivity.181 However, this displacement of unskilled labor by 
technology-based change is now continuous.182 Before unskilled workers 
get to the upswing on the J-curve, they are met with more technological 
change and thus move from the declining segment of one J-curve to the 
next.183 
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While older economic models tended to assume that any such lags in 
labor mobility were temporary, recent scholarship has found this may not 
be the case, especially in the context of the unparalleled growth of the 
Chinese economy.184 In a study measuring increases in imports between 
the years of 1991 and 2007, David Autor and others found “the U.S. and 
the other high income countries experienced rising imports in almost all 
of the 397 harmonized four-digit manufacturing industries, and the 
pattern of import growth across industries is highly correlated between 
the U.S. and the other countries.”185 China’s considerable gains in market 
penetration across numerous countries in the same time period suggests 
that “China’s falling prices, rising quality, and diminishing trade and 
tariff costs in these surging sectors are a root cause.”186 Accordingly, due 
to China’s increased share of manufacturing imports in developed 
countries, Chinese import competition had a negative impact on 
manufacturing employment.187 
While the effects of outsourcing in services has less of a negative 
impact in developed countries than the outsourcing of manufacturing 
jobs, a similar pattern could emerge where trade in services to be further 
liberalized, especially in English-speaking countries. India has a 
competitive advantage in services thanks to a large pool of skilled, 
English-speaking workers who are available at wages far lower than in 
the developed world.188 For example, the estimated salary range for 
Indian software developers in 2010 was about $5,300 to $9,700, 
compared with $53,000 to $80,000 in the United States.189 And again, 
while India’s impressive economic growth in the service industry may 
seem like a win for globalization and trade liberalization, growth has 
mainly benefitted the affluent upper class with “very little if any trickling 
down to the rural poor” who accounts for nearly two-thirds of India’s 1.2 
billion people.190 Further, as China’s economy matures, it will likely 
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move from a manufacturing based economy to a service based 
economy.191 A fully developed Chinese service economy would thus 
have the potential to destabilize service sectors in developed countries, in 
the same way that China’s manufacturing growth has undermined the 
manufacturing sectors in both developed192 and developing countries.193 
Countries must address the inequitable redistribution fueled by 
globalization. “Rising income inequality creates [serious] economic, 
social[,] and political challenges,” and “can stifle upward social 
mobility.”194 The way the system currently works is Robin Hood-esque—
if Robin stole from the poor and gave to the rich. “People will no longer 
support [free] trade if they feel they are losing out while a small group of 
winners” and the citizens of foreign countries become richer.195 And, as 
elections of the past few years have revealed, people are beginning to 
notice. From the election of an “America First” president in the United 
States,196 to anti-European sentiment in the United Kingdom,197 to anti-
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free trade protestations from member countries of the European Union, 
the rise of anti-globalization sentiment is growing.198 If this problem 
continues to go unaddressed, it will lead to increased distrust of free 
trade and could result in a wholesale rejection of free trade—throwing 
out not only free trade’s flaws, but its virtues as well. 
IV. SOLUTIONS 
So exactly how can developed countries address the toxic economic 
conditions brought about by globalization and rapid technological 
change? As discussed above, the effects of globalization are not negative 
on a global scale. The average real income of the world citizen has risen 
considerably over the last thirty years, and, with that, the global standard 
of living.199 Further, since the greatest growth in real income has been 
achieved by those in the bottom two-thirds of the global income 
distribution, the wealth gap between countries is shrinking.200 
However, the current economic conditions have also led to 
exploitation of labor by corporate interests.201 Corporations can respond 
to calls for increased wages by relocating jobs to developing countries to 
cut costs. And because the WTO makes it so difficult for member states 
to enact protections for domestic jobs, corporations profit at the expense 
of the poor and lower-middle classes in developed countries while 
exploiting cheap labor in developing countries. 
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Thus, a solution to the problems caused by current economic 
conditions must address the wealth disparities being created within 
developed countries, while at the same time being mindful of the benefits 
that globalization and trade liberalization can create. Below, this Article 
proposes two possible responses to combat the inequality of gains that 
liberalized trade has promoted, while dismissing a third response: pulling 
out of the WTO, which the Trump administration has contemplated.202 
A. Withdrawing from the WTO Will Not Solve the Trade Problem 
Although this Article paints a bleak picture of the post-globalization 
world, the benefits of liberalized trade should not be ignored. While not 
everyone gains from trade liberalization, countries with freer trade tend 
to have a higher standard of living and grow faster.203 Increased global 
trade also leads to closer relationships between countries and has the 
potential to reduce inter-nation conflict.204 The goal is to take advantage 
of these benefits in such a way that all countries and people benefit. 
If developed countries began withdrawing from the WTO, as the 
Trump administration has contemplated, this goal could not be achieved. 
Even large, developed WTO members such as the European Union and 
the United States are unlikely to gain anything by withdrawal and re-
negotiation of trade relations within the WTO’s framework.  
First, withdrawing from the WTO will not make other countries more 
willing to re-negotiate less favorable trade deals. As evidenced by the 
United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, this is likely to 
inspire the exact opposite reaction: other countries will draw a hard line 
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and refuse to negotiate on a withdrawing country’s terms.205 As 
mentioned above, there has been a dramatic power shift in the WTO over 
the past twenty-five years. As failed attempts to complete any substantial 
trade concessions in the Doha Round show, emerging economic powers 
such as China, India, and Brazil are unlikely to allow developed 
countries to negotiate one-sided trade deals as they did in the past.206 
The likelihood of failure to renegotiate mutually beneficial trade deals 
leads to the second problem: escalating trade wars, in which states enact 
trade policies that are too protectionist.207 Trade wars, especially between 
major exporting powers, could lead to a severe reduction in global real 
income208 and the loss of millions of jobs.209 In the end, trade wars hurt 
consumers most of all. Moreover, a trade war with a rising economic 
power such as China poses two significant problems: (1) China is the 
world’s fastest-growing export market, which will put severe pressure on 
other countries’ export industries, and (2) China could curtail its 
purchase of foreign debt, which could result in serious consequences for 
financial asset prices.210 As the last few years have shown, retaliatory 
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tariffs weaken international stability211 and create substantial economic 
losses.212  
Ultimately, withdrawing from the WTO poses too large a risk for 
countries and international stability. While the WTO may certainly have 
its shortcomings, exiting the system would leave a country with no legal 
rights or remedies, leading countries into a vicious cycle of retaliatory 
tariffs and other trade restrictions. Thus, a solution within the confines of 
the WTO’s rules is both necessary and appropriate. 
B. The “Locally Sourced” Environmental Tax 
One way in which countries might protect the domestic industry and 
minimize the extent of outsourcing is by implementing an environmental 
tax based on the distance goods travel from where they are manufactured 
to where they are sold. For example, a country might place a one-dollar-
per-mile tax on all goods, both foreign and domestically produced. 
Therefore, if a car is manufactured in Detroit, Michigan and sold in 
Chicago, Illinois, the environmental tax would be around $300. 
Similarly, if a car is produced in Monterrey, Mexico and sold in San 
Antonio, Texas, the environmental tax would be somewhere around 
$300. 
Enacting a blanket tax such as this would likely lead other countries to 
bring claims that the environmental tax violates GATT Articles I and 
III.213 As noted above, Article I of the GATT prohibits countries from 
imposing duties or charges of any kind that are more favorable to one 
country than another.214 This treatment requires that any “advantage, 
favour, privilege or immunity” granted by any WTO member to products 
“originating in or destined for any other country [] be accorded 
immediately and unconditionally to [] like product originating in or 
destined for the territories of [other countries].”215 Article III, on the 
  
 211. Witold Gadomski, Trade Wars Undermine Global Stability, ASPEN REV., 
Jan. 2019, at 15, 18, https://s3.eu-central-
1.amazonaws.com/uploads.mangoweb.org/shared-
prod/aspeninstitutece.org/uploads/2019/03/ebook_Aspen-Review-1_2019_origin1.pdf. 
 212. See Timothy Meyer, Trade, Redistribution, and the Imperial Presidency, 44 
YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 16, 16 (2018).  
 213. GATT, supra note 22, arts. I, III. 
 214. Id. art. I. 
 215. Id. 
2020] The Inevitable Backlash to Globalization 731 
other hand, prohibits WTO members from subjecting imported goods to 
internal taxes in excess of those applied to “like” domestic products.216 
While a “locally sourced” environmental tax could be implemented 
without discriminating on its face, the resulting tax could lead to de facto 
discrimination against WTO members. For instance, were France to levy 
such a tax on automobiles, cars imported from Germany would be given 
a definite advantage over Japan or the United States as cars produced 
anywhere in Germany would be closer to the location of their final sale 
than any cars manufactured in Japan or the United States. Because the 
AB has interpreted Article I to cover de facto, as well as de jure, 
discrimination,217 the AB would likely find such a tax to violate the 
GATT.  
Likewise, such a tax might be found to violate Article III’s “national 
treatment” requirement. Under GATT Article III, members may not 
subject products from any other member’s territory to internal taxes in 
excess of those applied to like domestic products, nor may a member 
dissimilarly tax domestic products and WTO-member products to afford 
protection when such products are directly competitive or substitutive.218 
Although the “locally sourced” tax likely violates both Articles I and 
III, the tax would likely qualify as an Article XX(b) or (g) exception to 
the GATT.219 Article XX(b) allows a country to adopt measures that are 
“necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,” while 
Article XX(g) allows measures that “relat[e] to the conservation of 
exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effective in 
conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.”220 
In order for a measure to qualify as an exception under Article XX, it 
must: (1) fall within the range of an Article XX exception; (2) be 
necessary to fulfill a State’s policy objective; and (3) be applied in 
conformity with the requirements of the introductory clause of Article 
XX, or the chapeau.221 
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The “locally sourced” tax aimed at reducing carbon emissions would 
fall under the Article XX(b) exception for protecting human, animal and 
plant life or health as the contours of this exception to the GATT have 
provoked little controversy within the WTO dispute system. While there 
is a question as to whether WTO parties can protect or care about human, 
animal or plant health or life outside of their own territories, there is a 
clear jurisdictional nexus for measures aimed at lowering carbon 
emissions. Pollution generated outside of a State’s territory likely will 
have a direct effect on that State, insofar as the ramifications of pollution 
do not stop at State borders. Pollution from Chinese factories makes its 
way into South Korea, Japan, and even the western United States.222 
Even putting this to the side, the act of transporting the goods into a State 
enacting a “locally sourced” tax would accord that country’s legislative 
jurisdiction. As the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice 
held in regard to the European Union Directive 2008/101,223 by 
physically entering the territory of a country, others are subject to the 
jurisdiction of that country.224  
A “locally sourced” tax would also likely satisfy the “necessary” 
component of Article XX(b). Determination of whether a measure is 
necessary involves weighing and balancing the facts surrounding the 
measure, including: (1) the importance of the common interests or values 
protected; (2) the contribution of the measure to the ends pursued; and 
(3) the impact of the measure on imports or exports.225 As the WTO 
Panel noted in Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, 
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“few interests are more ‘vital’ and ‘important’ than protecting human 
beings from health risks, and that protecting the environment is no less 
important.”226 Thus, the importance of the interests protected by the tax 
would be at its highest. A measure contributes to the achievement of its 
objective “when there is a genuine relationship of ends and means 
between the objective pursued and the measure at issue.”227 A “locally 
sourced” tax predicated on reducing carbon emissions would contribute 
to reducing pollution by encouraging consumers to buy products 
manufactured closer to home since those shipped from far away would 
come with a higher price tag. 
The “locally sourced” tax would also fall under the Article XX(g) 
exception for the conservation of exhaustible resources as related to the 
conservation of the earth’s climate, along with plants and animals that 
might disappear as a result of climate change.228 The AB has held that the 
term “natural resource” is evolutionary and must be interpreted in light 
of contemporary concerns of countries regarding the protection of the 
environment.229 Given the current international concern about climate 
change,230 the WTO would assuredly consider the Earth’s climate and the 
potential of climate change-induced extinction of animal and plant life as 
falling under the purview of this exception. 
The more difficult task for the “locally sourced” tax will be passing 
the twin requirements of Article XX’s chapeau: (1) no arbitrary 
discrimination or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail and (2) no disguised restriction on trade.231 
While few measures have survived the chapeau’s scrutiny, the “locally 
sourced” tax is different from many of the failing measures because it 
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would also create additional costs for domestic producers.232 Unlike other 
measures that have failed for imposing inflexible standards or coercing 
the policy decisions of foreign governments, the “locally sourced” tax 
does not force foreign countries to adopt the standards of the 
implementing country.233 Here, producers would still be free to export 
and import goods to and from an implementing country—it would only 
encourage producers to manufacture in that country to benefit from lower 
taxes, but not force them to. Implementing legislatures would, therefore, 
be wise to make clear that the tax was adopted for reasons relating to the 
environment or human health.234  
The “locally sourced” tax provides countries with a solution to two of 
the problems often associated with free trade and the WTO: its 
distributional impact on economies and Member States’ ability to 
regulate the environment. The tax not only penalizes companies 
engaging in practices that require the shipping of goods over long 
distances, but it also encourages companies to produce locally for each 
market, benefitting the local economy. With such a policy in place, if a 
South Korean auto manufacturer wants cheaper access to the German 
market, it might build a factory in Germany, thereby stimulating 
Germany’s economy. 
C. Wage Subsidies 
Subsidies provide another valuable tool for legislators to combat the 
comparative advantage that many developing countries have over 
developed countries. Under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures, subsidies are divided into a three-pronged 
“traffic light” system.235 “Export subsidies and subsidies contingent on 
the use of domestic products” are “red light” subsides and are 
prohibited.236 “Subsidies that are not ‘specific’ or that offer specific 
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forms of assistance for ‘research activities,’ ‘disadvantaged regions,’ or 
adaptation to ‘new environmental requirements’” are “green light” 
subsidies, which are explicitly permitted and cannot be challenged at the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) or lead to countervailing 
measures.237 All other subsidies are “orange light” subsidies that can be 
challenged directly at the DSU or lead to countervailing measures.238  
As mentioned above, to address the wealth redistribution problem 
created by trade liberalization, policies should be designed so that their 
benefits accrue to those who bear the adverse effects of free trade. Thus, 
subsidies should be designed to maximize economic gains for the low 
and middle classes in developed countries and laborers in developing 
countries. A wage subsidy for employees is ideal as it goes directly to the 
group that needs it most, bypassing the risk of trickle-down subsidies 
being pocketed by companies.239 
A subsidy contingent on paying all workers a certain minimum wage 
could be beneficial to citizens of both developed and developing 
countries. For example, if a subsidy is conditioned on a company paying 
all of its workers $9 per hour, one of two things happens. First, there 
could be a reduction in low-skilled manufacturing jobs being offshored. 
If the subsidy contains sufficient incentives, corporations might find it 
more efficient to maintain more manufacturing plants in developed 
countries. This would be a huge boon to the most vulnerable segment of 
the population in developed countries. 
The second possible reaction to such a subsidy is an improved 
standard of living for those in developing countries. In instances where a 
developing country still has a comparative advantage despite the 
requirements for obtaining the subsidy making a developed country’s 
minimum wage more competitive, the granting of subsidies would 
improve the welfare of those in developing countries. Although this 
might strike some as a form of inter-nation welfare whereby developing 
countries subsidize the workforce in a foreign country, it would be no 
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different from the aid that countries like the United States already 
provide to many third world countries,240 except in this case, the money 
would go directly to the people, and not the government.241 Such a direct 
form of aid to developing countries is potentially more efficient and will 
do more to stimulate these countries’ economies in the long run.242 As 
Nobel Prize-winning economist Angus Deaton has argued, foreign aid to 
developing countries might actually weaken a country because the influx 
of money can make governments less accountable to the people as they 
no longer need to rely on collecting taxes to run the country.243 
The problem with subsidies is that if they are “specific”—that is, if 
they appear to be targeted towards aiding a particular industry or 
industries—and if the subsidy causes injury to a domestic producer, they 
are actionable and other countries can impose countervailing duties on 
goods that benefit from a subsidy.244 Thus, a country wanting to 
subsidize incomes might have to grant subsidies to a wide range of 
industries, including industries that might not need to be subsidized. 
Such a broadly implemented subsidy could prove exceedingly costly to a 
government, leading to money being taken away from other areas of 
public funding, such as social programs or infrastructure. 
One solution to this problem could be the revival of explicit “green 
light” subsidies that expired on January 1, 2000, and adding wage 
subsidies to that list.245 The restoration of expressly legal subsidies and 
the addition of wage subsidies to that list might be difficult given the 
power shift within the WTO and the lack of consensus among countries 
during the Doha Round.246 However, rising wages in China might be 
used as leverage in gaining China’s support for green-lighting wage 
subsidies. If China and other developing countries that have seen wage 
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spikes in recent years fear a second wave of outsourcing, from 
developing countries to least developed, support for wage subsidies 
might have broader support than just from developed countries. Were 
wage subsidies to be explicitly legalized by the WTO, both developed 
and developing countries could utilize them to spur domestic job growth 
and ensure that working-class citizens received the benefits of increased 
world trade.   
V. CONCLUSION 
As President Obama stated, rising income inequality is the “defining 
challenge of our time.”247 At the same time, President Obama’s former 
economic advisor, Larry Summers, argued that “the basic responsibility 
of government is to maximize the welfare of citizens, not to pursue some 
abstract concept of the global good.”248 It is important to keep these 
statements in mind when developing a solution for the imbalances caused 
by free trade. Although globalization and free trade have played major 
roles in increasing global economic gains, the unequal distribution of 
these gains threatens to lead countries down the path of isolationism, 
protectionist policies. Therefore, this Article has argued that both 
individual countries and the WTO should pursue policies that create a 
more equitable distribution of wealth. Free trade can be a powerful force 
for global good, but it has to work for everyone. 
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